tls/s2n_auth_selection.c (116 lines of code) (raw):
/*
* Copyright Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License").
* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* A copy of the License is located at
*
* http://aws.amazon.com/apache2.0
*
* or in the "license" file accompanying this file. This file is distributed
* on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either
* express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing
* permissions and limitations under the License.
*/
#include "tls/s2n_auth_selection.h"
#include "crypto/s2n_certificate.h"
#include "crypto/s2n_signature.h"
#include "tls/s2n_cipher_suites.h"
#include "tls/s2n_kex.h"
#include "tls/s2n_signature_algorithms.h"
#include "utils/s2n_safety.h"
/* This module should contain any logic related to choosing a valid combination of
* signature algorithm, authentication method, and certificate to use for authentication.
*
* We choose our auth methods by:
* 1. Finding a cipher suite with an auth method that we have valid certs for. In TLS1.3,
* this is a no-op -- cipher suites do not specify an auth method.
* 2. Choosing a signature algorithm that matches both the auth method (if set) and the
* available certs.
* 3. Selecting the cert that matches the chosen signature algorithm.
*
* This is a break from the original s2n pre-TLS1.3 flow, when we could choose certs and
* ciphers at the same time. Our cipher suites differentiate between "RSA" and "ECDSA",
* but not between "RSA" and "RSA-PSS". To make that decision, we need to wait until
* we've chosen a signature algorithm. This allows us to use RSA-PSS with existing
* TLS1.2 cipher suites.
*/
int s2n_get_auth_method_for_cert_type(s2n_pkey_type cert_type, s2n_authentication_method *auth_method)
{
switch (cert_type) {
case S2N_PKEY_TYPE_RSA:
case S2N_PKEY_TYPE_RSA_PSS:
*auth_method = S2N_AUTHENTICATION_RSA;
return S2N_SUCCESS;
case S2N_PKEY_TYPE_ECDSA:
*auth_method = S2N_AUTHENTICATION_ECDSA;
return S2N_SUCCESS;
case S2N_PKEY_TYPE_MLDSA:
case S2N_PKEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
case S2N_PKEY_TYPE_SENTINEL:
POSIX_BAIL(S2N_ERR_CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED);
}
POSIX_BAIL(S2N_ERR_CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED);
}
static int s2n_is_sig_alg_valid_for_cipher_suite(s2n_signature_algorithm sig_alg, struct s2n_cipher_suite *cipher_suite)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cipher_suite);
s2n_pkey_type cert_type_for_sig_alg = S2N_PKEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_signature_algorithm_get_pkey_type(sig_alg, &cert_type_for_sig_alg));
/* Non-ephemeral key exchange methods require encryption, and RSA-PSS certificates
* do not support encryption.
*
* Therefore, if a cipher suite uses a non-ephemeral kex, then any signature
* algorithm that requires RSA-PSS certificates is not valid.
*/
const struct s2n_kex *kex = cipher_suite->key_exchange_alg;
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(kex);
if (!kex->is_ephemeral) {
POSIX_ENSURE_NE(cert_type_for_sig_alg, S2N_PKEY_TYPE_RSA_PSS);
}
/* If a cipher suite includes an auth method, then the signature algorithm
* must match that auth method.
*/
if (cipher_suite->auth_method != S2N_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD_SENTINEL) {
s2n_authentication_method auth_method_for_sig_alg;
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_get_auth_method_for_cert_type(cert_type_for_sig_alg, &auth_method_for_sig_alg));
POSIX_ENSURE_EQ(cipher_suite->auth_method, auth_method_for_sig_alg);
}
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
static int s2n_certs_exist_for_sig_scheme(struct s2n_connection *conn, const struct s2n_signature_scheme *sig_scheme)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(sig_scheme);
s2n_pkey_type cert_type = S2N_PKEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_signature_algorithm_get_pkey_type(sig_scheme->sig_alg, &cert_type));
/* A valid cert must exist for the authentication method. */
struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *cert = s2n_get_compatible_cert_chain_and_key(conn, cert_type);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cert);
/* For TLS1.3 sig_algs that include a curve, the group must also match. */
if (sig_scheme->signature_curve && conn->actual_protocol_version >= S2N_TLS13) {
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cert->private_key);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cert->cert_chain);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cert->cert_chain->head);
POSIX_ENSURE_EQ(cert->cert_chain->head->pkey_type, S2N_PKEY_TYPE_ECDSA);
POSIX_ENSURE_EQ(cert->cert_chain->head->info.public_key_nid, sig_scheme->signature_curve->libcrypto_nid);
}
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
static int s2n_certs_exist_for_auth_method(struct s2n_connection *conn, s2n_authentication_method auth_method)
{
if (auth_method == S2N_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD_SENTINEL) {
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
s2n_authentication_method auth_method_for_cert_type;
for (int i = 0; i < S2N_CERT_TYPE_COUNT; i++) {
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_get_auth_method_for_cert_type(i, &auth_method_for_cert_type));
if (auth_method != auth_method_for_cert_type) {
continue;
}
if (s2n_get_compatible_cert_chain_and_key(conn, i) != NULL) {
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
}
POSIX_BAIL(S2N_ERR_CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED);
}
/* TLS1.3 ciphers are always valid, as they don't include an auth method.
*
* A pre-TLS1.3 cipher suite is valid if:
* - At least one compatible cert is configured
*
* This method is called by the server when choosing a cipher suite.
*/
int s2n_is_cipher_suite_valid_for_auth(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_cipher_suite *cipher_suite)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cipher_suite);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_certs_exist_for_auth_method(conn, cipher_suite->auth_method));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
/* A signature algorithm is valid if:
* - At least one compatible cert is configured.
* - The signature algorithm is allowed by the cipher suite's auth method
* (if running as a pre-TLS1.3 server).
*
* This method is called by the both server and client when choosing a signature algorithm.
*/
int s2n_is_sig_scheme_valid_for_auth(struct s2n_connection *conn, const struct s2n_signature_scheme *sig_scheme)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn->secure);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(sig_scheme);
struct s2n_cipher_suite *cipher_suite = conn->secure->cipher_suite;
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cipher_suite);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_certs_exist_for_sig_scheme(conn, sig_scheme));
/* For the client side, signature algorithm does not need to match the cipher suite. */
if (conn->mode == S2N_SERVER) {
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_is_sig_alg_valid_for_cipher_suite(sig_scheme->sig_alg, cipher_suite));
}
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
/* A cert is valid if:
* - The configured cipher suite's auth method (if present) supports the cert.
*
* We could also verify that at least one of our supported sig algs
* supports the cert, but that seems unnecessary. If we don't have a valid
* sig alg, we'll fail on CertVerify.
*
* This method is called by the client when receiving the server's cert.
*/
int s2n_is_cert_type_valid_for_auth(struct s2n_connection *conn, s2n_pkey_type cert_type)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn->secure);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn->secure->cipher_suite);
s2n_authentication_method auth_method;
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_get_auth_method_for_cert_type(cert_type, &auth_method));
if (conn->secure->cipher_suite->auth_method != S2N_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD_SENTINEL) {
S2N_ERROR_IF(auth_method != conn->secure->cipher_suite->auth_method, S2N_ERR_CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED);
}
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
/* Choose the cert associated with our configured signature algorithm.
*
* This method is called by the server after configuring its cipher suite and sig algs.
*/
int s2n_select_certs_for_server_auth(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key **chosen_certs)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn->handshake_params.server_cert_sig_scheme);
s2n_signature_algorithm sig_alg = conn->handshake_params.server_cert_sig_scheme->sig_alg;
s2n_pkey_type cert_type = S2N_PKEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_signature_algorithm_get_pkey_type(sig_alg, &cert_type));
*chosen_certs = s2n_get_compatible_cert_chain_and_key(conn, cert_type);
S2N_ERROR_IF(*chosen_certs == NULL, S2N_ERR_CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED);
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}