app/policies/project_policy.rb (1,068 lines of code) (raw):

# frozen_string_literal: true class ProjectPolicy < BasePolicy include ArchivedAbilities desc "Project has public builds enabled" condition(:public_builds, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.public_builds? } # For guest access we use #team_member? so we can use # project.members, which gets cached in subject scope. # This is safe because team_access_level is guaranteed # by ProjectAuthorization's validation to be at minimum # GUEST desc "User has guest access" condition(:guest) { team_member? } # This is not a linear condition (some policies available for planner might not be available for higher access levels) desc "User has planner access" condition(:planner) { team_access_level == Gitlab::Access::PLANNER } desc "User has reporter access" condition(:reporter) { team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::REPORTER } desc "User has developer access" condition(:developer) { team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::DEVELOPER } desc "User has maintainer access" condition(:maintainer) { team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::MAINTAINER } desc "User has owner access" condition :owner do owner_of_personal_namespace = project.owner.present? && project.owner == @user unless owner_of_personal_namespace group_or_project_owner = team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::OWNER end owner_of_personal_namespace || group_or_project_owner end desc "User is a project bot" condition(:project_bot) { user.project_bot? && team_member? } desc "Project is public" condition(:public_project, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.public? } desc "project is private" condition(:private_project, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.private? } desc "Project is visible to internal users" condition(:internal_access) do project.internal? && !user.external? end desc "User owns the project's organization" condition(:organization_owner) { owns_organization?(@subject.organization) } rule { admin | organization_owner }.enable :read_all_organization_resources desc "User is a member of the group" condition(:group_member, scope: :subject) { project_group_member? } desc "User is a requester of the group" condition(:group_requester, scope: :subject) { project_group_requester? } desc "User is external" condition(:external_user) { user.external? } desc "Project is archived" condition(:archived, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.archived? } desc "Project user pipeline variables minimum override role" condition(:project_pipeline_override_role_owner) { project.ci_pipeline_variables_minimum_override_role == 'owner' } desc "Project is in the process of being deleted" condition(:pending_delete) { project.pending_delete? } condition(:default_issues_tracker, scope: :subject) { project.default_issues_tracker? } desc "Container registry is disabled" # Do not use the scope option here as this condition depends # on both the user and the subject, and can lead to bugs like # https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/391551 condition(:container_registry_disabled) do if user.is_a?(DeployToken) (!user.read_registry? && !user.write_registry?) || user.revoked? || !project.container_registry_enabled? else !access_allowed_to?(:container_registry) end end desc "Container registry is enabled for everyone with access to the project" condition(:container_registry_enabled_for_everyone_with_access, scope: :subject) do project.container_registry_access_level == ProjectFeature::ENABLED end desc "Project has an external wiki" condition(:has_external_wiki, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.has_external_wiki? } desc "Project has request access enabled" condition(:request_access_enabled, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.request_access_enabled } desc "Has merge requests allowing pushes to user" condition(:has_merge_requests_allowing_pushes) do project.merge_requests_allowing_push_to_user(user).any? end desc "Deploy key with read access" condition(:download_code_deploy_key) do user.is_a?(DeployKey) && user.has_access_to?(project) end desc "Deploy key with write access" condition(:push_code_deploy_key) do user.is_a?(DeployKey) && user.can_push_to?(project) end desc "Deploy token with read_container_image scope" condition(:read_container_image_deploy_token) do user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project) && user.read_registry? end desc "Deploy token with create_container_image scope" condition(:create_container_image_deploy_token) do user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project) && user.write_registry? end desc "Deploy token with read_package_registry scope" condition(:read_package_registry_deploy_token) do user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project) && user.read_package_registry end desc "Deploy token with write_package_registry scope" condition(:write_package_registry_deploy_token) do user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project) && user.write_package_registry end desc "Deploy token with read access" condition(:download_code_deploy_token) do user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project) end desc "If user is authenticated via CI job token then the target project should be in scope" condition(:project_allowed_for_job_token_by_scope) do !@user&.from_ci_job_token? || @user.ci_job_token_scope.accessible?(project) end desc "Public, internal or project in the scope allowed via CI job token" condition(:project_allowed_for_job_token) do public_project? || internal_access? || project_allowed_for_job_token_by_scope? end desc "If the user is via CI job token and project container registry visibility allows access" condition(:job_token_container_registry) { job_token_access_allowed_to?(:container_registry) } desc "If the user is via CI job token and project package registry visibility allows access" condition(:job_token_package_registry) { job_token_access_allowed_to?(:package_registry) } desc "If the user is via CI job token and project ci/cd visibility allows access" condition(:job_token_builds) { job_token_access_allowed_to?(:builds) } desc "If the user is via CI job token and project releases visibility allows access" condition(:job_token_releases) { job_token_access_allowed_to?(:releases) } desc "If the user is via CI job token and project environment visibility allows access" condition(:job_token_environments) { job_token_access_allowed_to?(:environments) } desc "If the project is either public or internal" condition(:public_or_internal) do project.public? || project.internal? end with_scope :subject condition(:forking_allowed) do @subject.feature_available?(:forking, @user) end with_scope :subject condition(:metrics_dashboard_allowed) do access_allowed_to?(:metrics_dashboard) end with_scope :global condition(:mirror_available, score: 0) do ::Gitlab::CurrentSettings.current_application_settings.mirror_available end with_scope :subject condition(:classification_label_authorized, score: 32) do ::Gitlab::ExternalAuthorization.access_allowed?( @user, @subject.external_authorization_classification_label, @subject.full_path ) end with_scope :subject condition(:design_management_disabled) do !@subject.design_management_enabled? end with_scope :subject condition(:service_desk_enabled) { ::ServiceDesk.enabled?(@subject) } with_scope :subject condition(:model_experiments_enabled) do @subject.feature_available?(:model_experiments, @user) end with_scope :subject condition(:model_registry_enabled) do @subject.feature_available?(:model_registry, @user) end with_scope :subject condition(:resource_access_token_feature_available) do resource_access_token_feature_available? end condition(:resource_access_token_creation_allowed) { resource_access_token_creation_allowed? } # We aren't checking `:read_issue` or `:read_merge_request` in this case # because it could be possible for a user to see an issuable-iid # (`:read_issue_iid` or `:read_merge_request_iid`) but then wouldn't be # allowed to read the actual issue after a more expensive `:read_issue` # check. These checks are intended to be used alongside # `:read_project_for_iids`. # # `:read_issue` & `:read_issue_iid` could diverge in gitlab-ee. condition(:issues_visible_to_user, score: 4) do @subject.feature_available?(:issues, @user) end condition(:merge_requests_visible_to_user, score: 4) do @subject.feature_available?(:merge_requests, @user) end condition(:internal_builds_disabled) do !@subject.builds_enabled? end condition(:user_confirmed?) do @user && @user.confirmed? end condition(:build_service_proxy_enabled) do ::Feature.enabled?(:build_service_proxy, @subject) end condition(:user_defined_variables_allowed) do @subject.override_pipeline_variables_allowed?(team_access_level, @user) end condition(:push_repository_for_job_token_allowed) do if ::Feature.enabled?(:allow_push_repository_for_job_token, @subject) @user&.from_ci_job_token? && project.ci_push_repository_for_job_token_allowed? && @user.ci_job_token_scope.self_referential?(project) else false end end condition(:packages_disabled, scope: :subject) { !@subject.packages_enabled } condition(:runner_registration_token_enabled, scope: :subject) { @subject.namespace.allow_runner_registration_token? } features = %w[ merge_requests issues repository snippets wiki builds pages metrics_dashboard analytics operations monitor security_and_compliance environments feature_flags releases infrastructure model_experiments ] features.each do |f| # these are scored high because they are unlikely desc "Project has #{f} disabled" condition(:"#{f}_disabled", score: 32) { !access_allowed_to?(f.to_sym) } end condition(:project_runner_registration_allowed, scope: :subject) do Gitlab::CurrentSettings.valid_runner_registrars.include?('project') && @subject.runner_registration_enabled end condition :registry_enabled do Gitlab.config.registry.enabled end condition :packages_enabled do Gitlab.config.packages.enabled end condition :terraform_state_disabled do !Gitlab.config.terraform_state.enabled end condition(:namespace_catalog_available) { namespace_catalog_available? } desc "User has either planner or reporter access" condition(:planner_or_reporter_access) do can?(:reporter_access) || can?(:planner_access) end condition(:allow_guest_plus_roles_to_pull_packages_enabled, scope: :subject) do Feature.enabled?(:allow_guest_plus_roles_to_pull_packages, @subject.root_ancestor) end # `:read_project` may be prevented in EE, but `:read_project_for_iids` should # not. rule { guest | admin | organization_owner }.enable :read_project_for_iids rule { admin }.policy do enable :update_max_artifacts_size enable :read_storage_disk_path end rule { can?(:read_all_resources) }.enable :read_confidential_issues rule { guest }.enable :guest_access rule { planner }.enable :planner_access rule { reporter }.enable :reporter_access rule { developer }.enable :developer_access rule { maintainer }.enable :maintainer_access rule { owner | admin | organization_owner }.enable :owner_access rule { project_pipeline_override_role_owner & ~can?(:owner_access) }.prevent :change_restrict_user_defined_variables rule { can?(:owner_access) }.policy do enable :guest_access enable :planner_access enable :reporter_access enable :developer_access enable :maintainer_access enable :change_namespace enable :change_visibility_level enable :remove_project enable :archive_project enable :link_forked_project enable :remove_fork_project enable :destroy_merge_request enable :destroy_issue enable :set_issue_iid enable :set_issue_created_at enable :set_issue_updated_at enable :set_note_created_at enable :set_emails_disabled enable :set_show_default_award_emojis enable :set_show_diff_preview_in_email enable :set_warn_about_potentially_unwanted_characters enable :manage_owners enable :add_catalog_resource enable :destroy_pipeline enable :create_container_registry_protection_immutable_tag_rule end rule { can?(:guest_access) }.policy do enable :read_project enable :read_issue_board enable :read_issue_board_list enable :read_wiki enable :read_issue enable :read_label enable :read_milestone enable :read_snippet enable :read_project_member enable :read_note enable :create_project enable :create_issue enable :create_note enable :upload_file enable :read_cycle_analytics enable :award_emoji enable :read_pages_content enable :read_release enable :read_analytics enable :read_insights enable :read_upload end rule { can?(:planner_access) }.policy do enable :guest_access enable :admin_issue_board enable :admin_issue_board_list enable :update_issue enable :reopen_issue enable :admin_issue enable :admin_work_item enable :destroy_issue enable :read_confidential_issues enable :create_design enable :update_design enable :move_design enable :destroy_design enable :admin_label enable :admin_milestone enable :download_wiki_code enable :create_wiki enable :admin_wiki enable :read_internal_note enable :read_merge_request enable :export_work_items end rule { can?(:reporter_access) & can?(:create_issue) }.enable :create_incident rule { can?(:reporter_access) & can?(:read_environment) }.enable :read_freeze_period rule { can?(:create_issue) }.enable :create_work_item rule { can?(:create_issue) }.enable :create_task # These abilities are not allowed to admins that are not members of the project, # that's why they are defined separately. rule { guest & can?(:download_code) }.enable :build_download_code rule { guest & can?(:read_container_image) }.enable :build_read_container_image rule { guest & ~public_project }.enable :read_grafana rule { can?(:reporter_access) }.policy do enable :admin_issue_board enable :download_code enable :read_statistics enable :daily_statistics enable :download_wiki_code enable :create_snippet enable :update_issue enable :reopen_issue enable :admin_issue enable :admin_work_item enable :admin_label enable :admin_milestone enable :admin_issue_board_list enable :read_commit_status enable :read_build enable :read_container_image enable :read_harbor_registry enable :read_deploy_board enable :read_pipeline enable :read_pipeline_schedule enable :read_environment enable :read_deployment enable :read_merge_request enable :read_sentry_issue enable :read_prometheus enable :metrics_dashboard enable :read_confidential_issues enable :read_package enable :read_ci_cd_analytics enable :read_external_emails enable :read_internal_note enable :read_grafana enable :export_work_items enable :create_design enable :update_design enable :move_design enable :destroy_design end # We define `:public_user_access` separately because there are cases in gitlab-ee # where we enable or prevent it based on other coditions. rule { (~anonymous & public_project) | internal_access }.policy do enable :public_user_access enable :read_project_for_iids end rule { can?(:public_user_access) }.policy do enable :public_access enable :guest_access enable :build_download_code enable :request_access end rule { container_registry_enabled_for_everyone_with_access & can?(:public_user_access) }.policy do enable :build_read_container_image end rule { (can?(:public_user_access) | can?(:reporter_access)) & forking_allowed }.policy do enable :fork_project end rule { metrics_dashboard_disabled }.policy do prevent(:metrics_dashboard) end rule { environments_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_environment prevent :create_environment prevent :update_environment prevent :admin_environment prevent :destroy_environment prevent :read_deployment prevent :create_deployment prevent :update_deployment prevent :admin_deployment prevent :destroy_deployment end rule { feature_flags_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_feature_flag prevent :create_feature_flag prevent :update_feature_flag prevent :admin_feature_flag prevent :destroy_feature_flag prevent(:admin_feature_flags_user_lists) prevent(:admin_feature_flags_client) end rule { releases_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_release prevent :create_release prevent :update_release prevent :admin_release prevent :destroy_release end rule { monitor_disabled }.policy do prevent :metrics_dashboard prevent :read_sentry_issue prevent :create_sentry_issue prevent :update_sentry_issue prevent :admin_sentry_issue prevent :destroy_sentry_issue prevent :read_alert_management_alert prevent :create_alert_management_alert prevent :update_alert_management_alert prevent :admin_alert_management_alert prevent :destroy_alert_management_alert end rule { infrastructure_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_cluster prevent :create_cluster prevent :update_cluster prevent :admin_cluster prevent :destroy_cluster prevent(:read_pod_logs) prevent(:read_prometheus) prevent(:admin_project_google_cloud) prevent(:admin_project_aws) end rule { infrastructure_disabled | terraform_state_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_terraform_state prevent :create_terraform_state prevent :update_terraform_state prevent :admin_terraform_state prevent :destroy_terraform_state end rule { can?(:metrics_dashboard) }.policy do enable :read_deployment end rule { packages_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_package prevent :create_package prevent :update_package prevent :admin_package prevent :destroy_package end rule { owner | admin | organization_owner | guest | group_member | group_requester }.prevent :request_access rule { ~request_access_enabled }.prevent :request_access rule { (can?(:planner_access) | can?(:developer_access)) & can?(:create_issue) }.enable :import_issues rule { planner_or_reporter_access & can?(:create_work_item) }.enable :import_work_items rule { can?(:developer_access) }.policy do enable :create_package enable :admin_issue_board enable :admin_merge_request enable :update_merge_request enable :reopen_merge_request enable :create_commit_status enable :update_commit_status enable :create_build enable :update_build enable :cancel_build enable :read_resource_group enable :update_resource_group enable :create_merge_request_from enable :create_wiki enable :push_code enable :resolve_note enable :create_container_image enable :update_container_image enable :destroy_container_image enable :destroy_container_image_tag enable :destroy_container_registry_protection_tag_rule enable :create_environment enable :update_environment enable :destroy_environment enable :create_deployment enable :update_deployment enable :read_cluster # Deprecated as certificate-based cluster integration (`Clusters::Cluster`). enable :read_cluster_agent enable :use_k8s_proxies enable :create_release enable :update_release enable :destroy_release enable :publish_catalog_version enable :read_alert_management_alert enable :update_alert_management_alert enable :read_terraform_state enable :read_pod_logs enable :read_feature_flag enable :create_feature_flag enable :update_feature_flag enable :destroy_feature_flag enable :admin_feature_flag enable :admin_feature_flags_user_lists enable :update_escalation_status enable :read_secure_files enable :update_sentry_issue end rule { can?(:developer_access) & user_confirmed? }.policy do enable :create_pipeline enable :update_pipeline enable :cancel_pipeline enable :create_pipeline_schedule end rule { can?(:maintainer_access) }.policy do enable :destroy_package enable :admin_package enable :admin_issue_board enable :push_to_delete_protected_branch enable :update_snippet enable :admin_snippet enable :rename_project enable :admin_project_member enable :invite_member enable :admin_note enable :admin_wiki enable :admin_project enable :admin_integrations enable :admin_commit_status enable :admin_build enable :admin_container_image enable :admin_pipeline enable :admin_environment enable :admin_deployment enable :destroy_deployment enable :admin_pages enable :read_pages enable :update_pages enable :remove_pages enable :add_cluster enable :create_cluster enable :update_cluster enable :admin_cluster enable :create_environment_terminal enable :destroy_release enable :destroy_artifacts enable :admin_operations enable :admin_sentry enable :read_deploy_token enable :create_deploy_token enable :destroy_deploy_token enable :admin_terraform_state enable :create_freeze_period enable :read_freeze_period enable :update_freeze_period enable :destroy_freeze_period enable :admin_feature_flags_client enable :register_project_runners enable :create_runner enable :admin_project_runners enable :read_project_runners enable :read_runners_registration_token enable :update_runners_registration_token enable :admin_project_google_cloud enable :admin_project_aws enable :admin_secure_files enable :admin_upload enable :destroy_upload enable :admin_incident_management_timeline_event_tag enable :stop_environment enable :read_import_error enable :admin_cicd_variables enable :admin_push_rules enable :admin_runner enable :manage_deploy_tokens enable :manage_merge_request_settings enable :manage_protected_tags enable :change_restrict_user_defined_variables enable :create_protected_branch enable :admin_protected_branch enable :admin_protected_environments end rule { can?(:manage_protected_tags) }.policy do enable :read_protected_tags enable :create_protected_tags enable :update_protected_tags enable :destroy_protected_tags end rule { can?(:admin_build) }.enable :manage_trigger rule { can?(:admin_runner) }.enable :read_runner rule { public_project & metrics_dashboard_allowed }.policy do enable :metrics_dashboard end rule { internal_access & metrics_dashboard_allowed }.policy do enable :metrics_dashboard end rule { (mirror_available & can?(:admin_project)) | admin }.enable :admin_remote_mirror rule { can?(:push_code) }.enable :admin_tag rule { archived }.policy do prevent(*archived_abilities) archived_features.each do |feature| prevent( :"create_#{feature}", :"update_#{feature}", :"admin_#{feature}" ) end end rule { archived & ~pending_delete }.policy do archived_features.each do |feature| prevent(:"destroy_#{feature}") end end rule { issues_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_issue prevent :create_issue prevent :update_issue prevent :admin_issue prevent :destroy_issue prevent :read_issue_board prevent :create_issue_board prevent :update_issue_board prevent :admin_issue_board prevent :destroy_issue_board prevent :read_issue_board_list prevent :create_issue_board_list prevent :update_issue_board_list prevent :admin_issue_board_list prevent :destroy_issue_board_list end rule { merge_requests_disabled | repository_disabled }.policy do prevent :create_merge_request_in prevent :create_merge_request_from prevent :read_merge_request prevent :create_merge_request prevent :update_merge_request prevent :admin_merge_request prevent :destroy_merge_request end rule { ~can?(:download_code) }.policy do prevent :create_merge_request_in end rule { pages_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_pages_content prevent :read_pages prevent :create_pages prevent :update_pages prevent :admin_pages prevent :destroy_pages end rule { issues_disabled & merge_requests_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_label prevent :create_label prevent :update_label prevent :admin_label prevent :destroy_label prevent :read_milestone prevent :create_milestone prevent :update_milestone prevent :admin_milestone prevent :destroy_milestone prevent :read_cycle_analytics end rule { snippets_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_snippet prevent :create_snippet prevent :update_snippet prevent :admin_snippet prevent :destroy_snippet end rule { analytics_disabled }.policy do prevent(:read_analytics) prevent(:read_insights) prevent(:read_cycle_analytics) prevent(:read_repository_graphs) prevent(:read_ci_cd_analytics) end rule { wiki_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_wiki prevent :create_wiki prevent :update_wiki prevent :admin_wiki prevent :destroy_wiki prevent :download_wiki_code end rule { download_code_deploy_token }.policy do enable :download_wiki_code end rule { builds_disabled | repository_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_build prevent :create_build prevent :update_build prevent :admin_build prevent :destroy_build prevent :cancel_build prevent :read_pipeline_schedule prevent :create_pipeline_schedule prevent :update_pipeline_schedule prevent :admin_pipeline_schedule prevent :destroy_pipeline_schedule prevent :read_environment prevent :create_environment prevent :update_environment prevent :admin_environment prevent :destroy_environment prevent :read_deployment prevent :create_deployment prevent :update_deployment prevent :admin_deployment prevent :destroy_deployment end # There's two separate cases when builds_disabled is true: # 1. When internal CI is disabled - builds_disabled && internal_builds_disabled # - We do not prevent the user from accessing Pipelines to allow them to access external CI # 2. When the user is not allowed to access CI - builds_disabled && ~internal_builds_disabled # - We prevent the user from accessing Pipelines rule { (builds_disabled & ~internal_builds_disabled) | repository_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_pipeline prevent :create_pipeline prevent :update_pipeline prevent :admin_pipeline prevent :destroy_pipeline prevent :cancel_pipeline prevent :read_commit_status prevent :create_commit_status prevent :update_commit_status prevent :admin_commit_status prevent :destroy_commit_status end rule { repository_disabled }.policy do prevent :build_push_code prevent :push_code prevent :download_code prevent :build_download_code prevent :fork_project prevent :read_commit_status prevent :read_pipeline prevent :read_pipeline_schedule prevent :read_feature_flag prevent :create_feature_flag prevent :update_feature_flag prevent :admin_feature_flag prevent :destroy_feature_flag prevent :admin_feature_flags_user_lists prevent :read_cluster prevent :create_cluster prevent :update_cluster prevent :admin_cluster prevent :destroy_cluster end rule { container_registry_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_container_image prevent :create_container_image prevent :update_container_image prevent :admin_container_image prevent :destroy_container_image prevent :destroy_container_image_tag prevent :destroy_container_registry_protection_tag_rule prevent :create_container_registry_protection_immutable_tag_rule end rule { anonymous & ~public_project }.prevent_all rule { public_project }.policy do enable :public_access enable :read_project_for_iids end # If the project is private rule { ~project_allowed_for_job_token }.prevent_all # If this project is public or internal we want to prevent all aside from a few public policies rule { public_or_internal & ~project_allowed_for_job_token_by_scope }.policy do prevent :guest_access prevent :planner_access prevent :public_access prevent :reporter_access prevent :developer_access prevent :maintainer_access prevent :owner_access end rule { public_project & ~project_allowed_for_job_token_by_scope }.policy do prevent :public_user_access end rule { can?(:developer_access) & push_repository_for_job_token_allowed }.policy do enable :build_push_code end rule { public_or_internal & job_token_container_registry }.policy do enable :build_read_container_image enable :read_container_image end rule { public_or_internal & job_token_package_registry }.policy do enable :read_package enable :read_project end rule { public_or_internal & job_token_builds }.policy do enable :read_commit_status # this is additionally needed to download artifacts end rule { public_or_internal & job_token_releases }.policy do enable :read_release end rule { public_or_internal & job_token_environments }.policy do enable :read_environment end rule { can?(:public_access) }.policy do enable :read_package enable :read_project enable :read_issue_board enable :read_issue_board_list enable :read_wiki enable :read_label enable :read_milestone enable :read_snippet enable :read_project_member enable :read_merge_request enable :read_note enable :read_pipeline enable :read_environment enable :read_deployment enable :read_commit_status enable :read_container_image enable :download_code enable :read_release enable :download_wiki_code enable :read_cycle_analytics enable :read_pages_content enable :read_analytics enable :read_insights enable :read_upload # NOTE: may be overridden by IssuePolicy enable :read_issue end rule { can?(:public_access) & public_builds }.policy do enable :read_ci_cd_analytics enable :read_pipeline_schedule end rule { public_builds }.policy do enable :read_build end rule { public_builds & can?(:guest_access) }.policy do enable :read_pipeline enable :read_pipeline_schedule end # These rules are included to allow maintainers of projects to push to certain # to run pipelines for the branches they have access to. rule { can?(:public_access) & has_merge_requests_allowing_pushes & user_confirmed? }.policy do enable :create_build enable :create_pipeline end rule do (can?(:read_project_for_iids) & issues_visible_to_user) | can?(:read_issue) end.enable :read_issue_iid rule do (~guest & can?(:read_project_for_iids) & merge_requests_visible_to_user) | can?(:read_merge_request) end.enable :read_merge_request_iid rule { ~can?(:read_cross_project) & ~classification_label_authorized }.policy do # Preventing access here still allows the projects to be listed. Listing # projects doesn't check the `:read_project` ability. But instead counts # on the `project_authorizations` table. # # All other actions should explicitly check read project, which would # trigger the `classification_label_authorized` condition. # # `:read_project_for_iids` is not prevented by this condition, as it is # used for cross-project reference checks. prevent :guest_access prevent :planner_access prevent :public_access prevent :public_user_access prevent :reporter_access prevent :developer_access prevent :maintainer_access prevent :owner_access end rule { blocked }.policy do prevent :create_pipeline end rule { can?(:read_issue) }.policy do enable :read_design enable :read_design_activity enable :read_issue_link enable :read_work_item end rule { can?(:read_merge_request) }.policy do enable :read_vulnerability_merge_request_link end rule { can?(:developer_access) }.policy do enable :read_security_configuration end rule { can?(:guest_access) & can?(:download_code) }.policy do enable :create_merge_request_in end # Design abilities could also be prevented in the issue policy. rule { design_management_disabled }.policy do prevent :read_design prevent :read_design_activity prevent :create_design prevent :update_design prevent :destroy_design prevent :move_design end rule { download_code_deploy_key }.policy do enable :download_code end rule { push_code_deploy_key }.policy do enable :push_code end rule { read_container_image_deploy_token }.policy do enable :read_container_image end rule { create_container_image_deploy_token }.policy do enable :create_container_image end rule { read_package_registry_deploy_token }.policy do enable :read_package enable :read_project end rule { write_package_registry_deploy_token }.policy do enable :create_package enable :read_package enable :destroy_package enable :read_project end rule { can?(:create_pipeline) & can?(:maintainer_access) }.enable :create_web_ide_terminal rule { build_service_proxy_enabled }.enable :build_service_proxy_enabled rule { can?(:download_code) }.policy do enable :read_repository_graphs end rule { can?(:read_build) & can?(:read_pipeline) }.policy do enable :read_build_report_results end rule { support_bot }.enable :guest_access rule { support_bot & ~service_desk_enabled }.policy do prevent :create_note prevent :read_project prevent :guest_access end rule { project_bot }.enable :project_bot_access rule { can?(:read_all_resources) & resource_access_token_feature_available }.enable :read_resource_access_tokens rule { can?(:admin_project) & resource_access_token_feature_available }.policy do enable :read_resource_access_tokens enable :destroy_resource_access_tokens end rule { can?(:admin_project) & resource_access_token_feature_available & resource_access_token_creation_allowed }.policy do enable :create_resource_access_tokens enable :manage_resource_access_tokens end rule { can?(:admin_project) }.policy do enable :read_usage_quotas enable :view_edit_page enable :read_web_hook enable :admin_web_hook end rule { can?(:project_bot_access) }.policy do prevent :create_resource_access_tokens prevent :manage_resource_access_tokens end rule { user_defined_variables_allowed }.policy do enable :set_pipeline_variables end rule { security_and_compliance_disabled }.policy do prevent :access_security_and_compliance end rule { can?(:developer_access) }.policy do enable :access_security_and_compliance end rule { ~admin & ~organization_owner & ~project_runner_registration_allowed }.policy do prevent :register_project_runners prevent :create_runner end rule { ~runner_registration_token_enabled }.policy do prevent :register_project_runners prevent :read_runners_registration_token prevent :update_runners_registration_token end rule { can?(:admin_project_member) }.policy do enable :import_project_members_from_another_project # ability to read, approve or reject member access requests of other users enable :admin_member_access_request enable :read_member_access_request end rule { registry_enabled & can?(:admin_container_image) }.policy do enable :view_package_registry_project_settings end rule { packages_enabled & can?(:admin_package) }.policy do enable :view_package_registry_project_settings end rule { can?(:read_project) }.policy do enable :read_incident_management_timeline_event_tag enable :read_project_metadata end rule { can?(:download_code) }.policy do enable :read_code end rule { can?(:developer_access) & namespace_catalog_available }.policy do enable :read_namespace_catalog end rule { public_project & model_registry_enabled }.policy do enable :read_model_registry end rule { ~public_project & guest & model_registry_enabled }.policy do enable :read_model_registry end rule { developer & model_registry_enabled }.policy do enable :write_model_registry end rule { public_project & model_experiments_enabled }.policy do enable :read_model_experiments end rule { ~public_project & guest & model_experiments_enabled }.policy do enable :read_model_experiments end rule { developer & model_experiments_enabled }.policy do enable :write_model_experiments end rule { ~private_project & guest & external_user }.enable :read_container_image rule { can?(:create_pipeline_schedule) }.policy do enable :read_ci_pipeline_schedules_plan_limit end # TODO: Remove this rule and move :read_package permission from # can?(:reporter_access) to can?(:guest_access) # with the rollout of the FF allow_guest_plus_roles_to_pull_packages # https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/512210 rule { can?(:guest_access) & allow_guest_plus_roles_to_pull_packages_enabled }.enable :read_package rule { can?(:admin_project_member) }.policy do enable :invite_project_members end private def team_member? return false if @user.nil? return false unless user_is_user? greedy_load_subject = false # when scoping by subject, we want to be greedy # and load *all* the members with one query. greedy_load_subject ||= DeclarativePolicy.preferred_scope == :subject # in this case we're likely to have loaded #members already # anyways, and #member? would fail with an error greedy_load_subject ||= !@user.persisted? if greedy_load_subject # We want to load all the members with one query. Calling #include? on # project.team.members will perform a separate query for each user, unless # project.team.members was loaded before somewhere else. Calling #to_a # ensures it's always loaded before checking for membership. project.team.members.to_a.include?(user) else # otherwise we just make a specific query for # this particular user. team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::GUEST end end def project_group_member? return false if @user.nil? return false unless user_is_user? project.group && project.group.member?(@user) end # rubocop: disable CodeReuse/ActiveRecord def project_group_requester? return false if @user.nil? return false unless user_is_user? project.group && project.group.requesters.exists?(user_id: @user.id) end # rubocop: enable CodeReuse/ActiveRecord def team_access_level return -1 if @user.nil? return -1 unless user_is_user? @team_access_level ||= lookup_access_level! end def lookup_access_level! return ::Gitlab::Access::REPORTER if alert_bot? return ::Gitlab::Access::REPORTER if support_bot? && service_desk_enabled? # NOTE: max_member_access has its own cache project.team.max_member_access(@user.id) end def access_allowed_to?(feature) return false unless project.project_feature case project.project_feature.access_level(feature) when ProjectFeature::DISABLED false when ProjectFeature::PRIVATE can?(:read_all_resources) || can?(:read_all_organization_resources) || team_access_level >= ProjectFeature.required_minimum_access_level(feature) else true end end def job_token_access_allowed_to?(feature) return false unless @user&.from_ci_job_token? return false unless project.project_feature case project.project_feature.access_level(feature) when ProjectFeature::DISABLED false when ProjectFeature::PRIVATE @user.ci_job_token_scope.accessible?(project) else true end end def resource_access_token_feature_available? true end def resource_access_token_create_feature_available? true end def resource_access_token_creation_allowed? group = project.group return true unless group # always enable for projects in personal namespaces resource_access_token_create_feature_available? && group.root_ancestor.namespace_settings.resource_access_token_creation_allowed? end def project @subject end def namespace_catalog_available? false end end ProjectPolicy.prepend_mod_with('ProjectPolicy')